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Trial Practice and Procedure
By J. Ralph Beaird* and C. Ronald Ellington**
Each year the Georgia appellate courts decide several hundred cases
that raise issues of trial practice and procedure. The period surveyed in
this article covers the tenth year of cases interpreting the Long-Arm Statute and the ninth year of cases decided under the Civil Practice Act. The
gradual judicial development of these important laws has been fascinating
to watch and comment on. A steady improvement in both the quality and
predictability of these decisions can be observed and should be applauded.
The cases selected for comment herein are those deemed the most significant because they either indicate a new direction or aptly illustrate an
important principle of procedure. Hopefully, the attempt to assess these
decisions critically will be of assistance to the bench and bar of the state
and will contribute to the development of a procedural system that fully
meets the mandate of C.P.A. §1, of securing "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
Generally, the areas of jurisdiction and venue will be discussed first in
the article, followed by cases arranged in numerical order under each rule
in the Civil Practice Act. Important amendments during the 1976 legislative session are included in conjunction with the discussion of venue and
pleading, respectively.
I.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

During this survey period the Georgia appellate courts decided several
cases interpreting the "transacts any business" section of the Georgia
Long-Arm Statute.' The first two cases illustrate well-settled applications
of the Long-Arm Statute. In Co-op Mortgage Investments Associates v.
Pendley,2 the original defendant sought to add a general partner of Co-op
Mortgage, the plaintiff, as a new party for the purpose of his counterclaim.
The prospective defendant was not a resident of Georgia. Nevertheless, the
court easily found that jurisdiction over the general partner was properly
* University Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. University of Alabama
(A.B., 1949; LL.B., 1951); George Washington University (LL.M., 1953).
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Emory University
(A.B., 1963); University of Virginia (LL.B. 1966).
The authors wish to express their appreciation to Carol B. Ray, a second-year law student
at the University of Georgia School of Law, for her valuable assistance in the preparation of
this article.
1.

GA.CODE ANN. §§ 24-113.1 to 118 (1971).

2.

134 Ga.App. 236, 214 S.E.2d 572 (1975).
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asserted under the "transacts any business" provision3 where the general
partner acted in Georgia to purchase property by negotiating, executing,
and delivering a sales contract, and then rented, improved, advertised, and
sold some 29 condominiums directly through a salaried resident agent. The
court held that the negotiations and contracts made within the state certainly constituted the required minimum contacts.
North Peachtree1-285 Properties,Ltd. v. Hicks' was a similar case. Here
the court of appeals upheld jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute when
literally all of the activities that gave rise to the cause of action took place
with the state. All the negotiations leading up to the sale were conducted
in Georgia, the sale was closed in Georgia, and the promissory note and
guaranty sued on were executed here. There could be no doubt that the
non-resident defendants who had done all these acts in the state had
established sufficient contacts with the state to allow personal jurisdiction
to be constitutionally asserted over them for causes of action arising out
of their activities.
As discussed in last year's survey article, 5 the transacting business section of the Long-Arm Statute is satisfied if significant negotiations preliminary to a subsequent out-of-state contract take place in Georgia. However,
good will inspection visits here prior to entering into a contract in another
state do not permit our courts to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident.
In ShealRustin Inc. v. Home Fashion Guild Ltd.,' the defendant was a
New York corporation that had negotiated and entered into a contract with
the Georgia plaintiff in New York. The defendant's only contact with
Georgia came after performance of the contract had begun. Home Fashion
sent one of its officials to the plaintiff's Atlanta plant to "direct and supervise" the work.7 During a two day visit the official negotiated for and
signed a supplementary agreement concerning certain cost details. The
court of appeals, relying on Delta Equities, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage
Investors,' found the activities during this two day visit "sufficient to
constitute the required 'minimum contacts' necessary to constitute 'transacting business'." 9
Process Systems, Inc. v. Dixie Packaging Co.' 0 illustrates a corollary of
Shea/Rustin. In this case the Georgia court was asked to give full faith and
credit to a New Jersey decision that exercised jurisdiction over a Georgia
corporation." All preliminary negotiations took place and the contract was
3.

GA.CODE ANN.

§ 24-113.1(a) (1971).

4. 136 Ga.App. 426, 221 S.E.2d 607 (1975).
5. See Beaird and Ellington, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Trial Practice and
Procedure,27 MER. L. REV. 235, 236-37 (1975).
6. 135 Ga.App. 88, 217 S.E.2d 405 (1975).
7. Id. at 89, 217 S.E.2d at 406.
8. 133 Ga.App. 382, 211 S.E.2d 9 (1974).
9. 135 Ga.App. at 90, 217 S.E.2d at 407.
10. 137 Ga.App. 452, 224 S.E.2d 103 (1976).
11. The court noted the differences between the Georgia statute and the New Jersey
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executed in Georgia. Subsequently, however, the Georgia defendant's president visited the plaintiff's plant in New Jersey on three occasions. During
one of these visits, he entered into a new agreement promising to pay part
of his past due account with each new cash order. When this plan failed
to reduce the delinquent debt, the New Jersey manufacturer sued the
Georgia customer in New Jersey to recover the amount owing and obtained
a default judgment. The court of appeals found that, consistent with
United States Supreme Court decisions,'" it was reasonable for New Jersey
to exercise jurisdiction in such circumstances and gave full faith and credit
to the New Jersey default judgment. It now appears that the Georgia
appellate courts are willing to uphold personal jurisdiction over nonresidents for claims on contracts even though the contract is entered into
in another state if the non-resident subsequently comes into the state to
supervise the details of performing the contract or, while visiting, enters
into subsidiary agreements pertaining to the work performed under the
contract.
The court of appeals found two bases for jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in Porter v. Mid-State Homes.'3 The non-resident defendant both transacted business and owned property in the state. In
Porter, the plaintiffs executed a security deed to Jim Walters Corporation
which was transferred to the out-of-state defendant. A dispute arose between the plaintiffs and the defendant that led the defendant to exercise
the power of sale contained in the security deed through its Georgia attorney by advertising the property for sale. The plaintiffs later claimed that
they were forced under duress to pay the defendant to prevent an unauthorized foreclosure and sued to recover the amount paid. The court held
personal jurisdiction over the non-resident was properly asserted because
the claim arose out of the defendant's ownership of real property in this
state through its interest in the land as a grantee in a deed to secure debt.
In addition, the non-resident had purposefully transacted business in the
state by advertising pursuant to the deed to secure debt in a local newspaper and accepting payment of money through its Georgia attorney. Thus,
the non-resident grantee of a security deed, or, as here, a transferee of the
grantee of such a deed, can be subjected to personal jurisdiction in the
state in two ways. As grantee of the security deed, the non-resident "has
legal title to the property subject to the right of the plaintiffs to have the
realty reconveyed to them upon payment of the debt,"'" and thus jurisdicstatute saying: "Whereas the Georgia Long Arm Statute (Code § 24-113.1(a)) confers jurisdiction over a foreign corporation as to a cause of action arising from the transaction of 'any
business' within the state, the New Jersey rule allows personal service outside the jurisdiction
in any case limited only by due process of law .. " 137 Ga. App. at 454, 224 S.E.2d at 105.
12. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957), Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
13. 133 Ga.App. 706, 213 S.E.2d 10 (1975).
14. Id. at 707, 213 S.E.2d at 12.
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tion is established under subsection (d) of the Long-Arm Statute. And, if
the grantee of such a deed attempts to exercise the power of sale by advertising the property or accepting payments in the state, jurisdiction seemingly exists under the transacting business part. In either case, of course,
the claim sued on must actually arise out of, and be closely connected with,
the basis of minimum contact enumerated in the statute.
Greenfield v. Portman'5 raises the possibility that a single noncommercial sale can amount to transacting business for the purpose of the
Long-Arm Statute. The court of appeals held that a complaint which
alleged the sale of one used car within the state by a non-resident was
sufficient to withstand a motion under C.P.A. §12(b)(2) to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction. However, because no evidence was introduced at
the motion to dismiss, the ruling was limited in two ways: First, the court
declined to make "any assumption with regard to whether this was a
'commercial' sale or not."" Second, the court refused to assume that notions of fair play and substantial justice had been offended, offering no
suggestion as to the outcome if evidence had been presented on this point.
Jurisdiction was properly asserted, as a matter of law, on the basis of facts
alleged in the complaint, i.e., that this claim sought relief for a breach of
warranty of a contract entered into by parties physically present within the
state.
While the above cases demonstrate anew the recent significant expansion of the reach of the Long-Arm Statute, they do not signal the abolition
of all restraints on its application. Unistrut Georgia,Inc. v. Faulkner Plastics, Inc. 17 shows that at least some minimum contacts are still necessary
to meet the requirements of fundamental fairness and due process. In
Unistrut a Georgia contractor sought to implead his Florida sub-contractor
on claims pertaining to defects in a plastic dome, predicating jurisdiction
on the Florida subcontractor's having either committed a tortious act by
failing to produce the dome according to written specifications or transacted business within the state. However, the duty which the subcontractor allegedly breached was one imposed by the contract between the parties and not by a law; therefore, such a breach could not be made actionable as a tortious wrong. Viewed properly as a contractual claim, jurisdiction based on transacting business also failed because all negotiations, the
contract itself, inspection visits, and delivery took place in Florida. The
sub-contractor did not solicit business in Georgia nor do any relevant act
here. Manufacturing a specially designed product in Florida pursuant to
a contract entered into in Florida with delivery taking place in Florida does
not warrant a Georgia court in exercising personal jurisdiction even though
the product is produced with the certain knowledge that it will be used in
Georgia.
15.
16.
17.

136 Ga.App. 541, 221 S.E.2d 704 (1975).
Id. at 544, 221 S.E.2d at 706.
135 Ga.App. 305, 217 S.E.2d 611 (1975).
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A question which arises in dealing with both the Long-Arm Statute and
the Non-Resident Motorist Act concerns the definition of "non-resident."
When is a person or a corporation a "non-resident" within the meaning of
the act so that personal jurisdiction may be asserted? Tecumseh Products
Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 11dealt with a foreign corporation formally
registered to do business in Georgia. Personal jurisdiction under the LongArm Statute was improper because the corporation, having domesticated,
was no longer a "non-resident" according to Georgia Code § 24-117.
In Webb v. Oliver," the supreme court was presented with an opportunity to review its decision in Young v. Morrison." As discussed in an earlier
survey article, Young opens an anomalous hole in Georgia's jurisdictional
schema.2 1 In Young, an amendment to the Nonresident Motorist Act, designed to extend personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who had been
Georgia residents at the time the cause of action arose was declared unconstitutional. As a result of Young, a person who was a Georgia resident at
the time of an automobile accident in this state is outside the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state if he becomes a resident of another state before
service is perfected. While the supreme court declined to review the court
of appeals decision in Webb v. Oliver,22 Justice Hill, in dissent, recognized
the many problems created by Young and urged reconsideration. Justice
Hill argued that "a resident of this State who leaves it has sufficient
contacts here to be called upon to defend a suit for a tort committed while
a resident."
In describing the wrong course taken earlier by the court, Justice Hill
notes the problem of dual residency, i.e., where the defendant has both a
Georgia and non-Georgia residence at the time of the accident. Justice Hill
suggested that in such a case, the residence at time of service should
control. If the Georgia residence is still maintained, the defendant should
be treated like any other Georgia resident. If the residence in Georgia had
been given up between the time the cause of action arose and service was
attempted, service should be proper under the Nonresident Motorist Act.2 4
18. 134 Ga.App. 102, 213 S.E.2d 522 (1975).
19. 234 Ga. 361, 216 S.E.2d 76 (1975).
20. 220 Ga. 127, 137 S.E.2d 456 (1964).
21. See Beaird and Ellington, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Trial Practice and
Procedure, 26 MER. L. REv. 239, 240 (1974).
22. 133 Ga.App. 555, 211 S.E.2d 605 (1974).
23. 234 Ga. at 362, 216 S.E.28 at 77.
24. GA. CODE ANN. §68-801 (1975). The real issue in Webb v. Oliver was determining
the residence of the defendant at the time of the accident. The court of appeals followed
Thompson v. Abbott, 226 Ga. 353, 174 S.E.2d 904 (1970), and found evidence that the defendant was a Georgia resident at that time; the Nonresident Motorist Statute was therefore not applicable. The result of letting the court of appeals decision in Webb v. Oliver stand
means, in Justice Hill's words: "[N]o matter how much evidence the plaintiff produced in
the court below to show that this defendant was a resident of Alabama on the date of the
collision, that evidence is 'irrelevant' under Thompson and defendant's evidence of residence
in Georgia must be accepted without trial by jury." 234 Ga. at 365, 216 S.E.2d at 78, 79.
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Although Justice Hill's suggestion seems a sensible one for handling the
problem of dual residence, the root problem is Young v. Morrison. Recently, a federal court in Georgia in a diversity case has concluded that
the Georgia Supreme Court would not preclude using the Long-Arm Act
to reach a defendant in a Young v. Morrison type case in light of its post1973 jurisdictional decisions. 5 Hopefully, that decision shows rare prescience."6
II.

VENUE

As discussed in last year's survey article, an amendment in 1975 to the
Corporation Code appeared to signal the legislature's intent to expand the
possibilities for venue in tort actions against corporations." This same
section, Georgia Code §22-404, was amended again in 1976 to eliminate
what was apparently only an inadvertent relaxation of these venue requirements. The 1976 amendment to §22-404(d) allows a corporation to be sued
in the county "where the cause of action originated, if the corporation
has an office and transacts business in that county.""5 The newly added
requirement of an office in the county means that venue for corporate
defendants is now substantially the same as under former §22-53011, before
the 1975 revision.
Three cases were decided last year interpreting old §22-5301's requirements for venue. In Davenport v. Petroleum Service of Georgia,Inc.," the
25. Jimerson v. Price, 411 F.Supp. 102, 104-05 (M.D. Ga. 1976), where Judge Owens
stated: "The restrictive reading given the long-arm statute in Thompson v. Abbott overlooks
the policy of the state as later explained by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Coe v. Payne to
protect the interests of Georgia plaintiffs and is clearly contrary to the statute's intent as
described in Greenfield v. Portman to expand the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts to full
constitutional limits. Surely, the promised protection is not forthcoming when the Georgia
plaintiff is deprived of a Georgia forum for his claim against a nonresident solely because he
is a former resident; if anything, it would seem to be more appropriate to require a former
resident to answer than a nonresident whose only contact with the state may be the one
incident giving rise to the lawsuit. In the absence of compelling authority to continue the
illogical distinction created by Thompson v. Abbott and in the face of compelling reasons to
disregard them, the court finds that, under Georgia law, the statute is applicable to a tort
claim against a nonresident defendant who was a Georgia resident at the time of the alleged
tort."
26. An additional case decided during this survey period illustrates the familiar rule that
nonresidents are immune from service while in Georgia attending court proceedings. In Steelman v. Fowler, 234 Ga. 706, 217 S.E.2d 285 (1975), the plaintiff came to Georgia to participate
in a contempt proceeding initiated by her against her former husband. The former wife was
served while in the judge's chambers with a complaint filed by the husband. The court held
that two separate proceedings were involved and that service was improper, therefore the
court did not have personal jurisdiction.
27. See Beaird and Ellington, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Trial Practice and
Procedure, 27 MER. L. REv. 235, 243-244 (1975).
28. Ga. Laws, 1976, p. 1576, 1577 (emphasis added).
29. GA.CoDE ANN. § 22-5301 (1970) repealed by Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 583.
30. 235 Ga. 116, 218 S.E.2d 848, aff'g 134 Ga.App. 418, 214 S.E.2d 692 (1975).
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supreme court defined "principal place of business" as it appeared in the
1968 version of §22-404(d) (now §22-404(f)) and held that the term applies
only to corporations incorporated prior to 1968.11 In Davenport the cause
of action arose out of a tort committed in Dekalb County; the corporate
defendant's only actual place of business was in Forsyth County, where the
suit was brought. The defendant, however, successfully had the action
dismissed for improper venue. The defendant had incorporated in 1971 and
had designated an initial "registered" office and agent as required by the
1968 Corporation Code. Although that agent had since resigned and no new
agent had been appointed, both the court of appeals and the supreme court
held that venue was proper only in Fulton County where the registered
office had been fixed. Georgia Code §22-404(b) provides that in the event
the registered agent resigns, the corporation shall be deemed still to reside
in the county where it last had a registered agent." The term "principal
office" in the statute was held not to mean a principal office in a factual
sense, but rather to provide for corporations incorporated before 1968
which were required to designate a "principal office" under the then existing corporation code. Thus, the requirement of a "principal office" for pre1968 corporations and a "registered office" for post-1968 incorporations
both refer to that location designated by the corporate charter as the office
of record.
In Hunton v. Colonial Pipeline Co.," plaintiffs attempted to predicate
venue in a tort action on the presence of defendant's pipeline in Paulding
County.34 The court of appeals, applying Georgia Code §22-5301, concluded venue was not proper because defendant had neither "a agent,
agency or place of business" in Paulding County as required by old §225301. Hunton, arguably, is a case where the application of the 1975 venue
provision would have dictated a different result than would old §22-5301
or the current version of §22-404(d). Operating a pipeline across a county
could well qualify as "transacting business" even though the corporate
defendant did not have an agent or office in the county.
The court of appeals also interpreted §22-5301's requirements for a cause
of action based on a contract. The section provided that suits on contract
may be brought against a corporation "in that county in which the contract
sought to be enforced was made or is to be performed, if it has an office
and transacts business there." 5 In Redi Development Co. v. Crabbe Pavers, Inc. ,36
the plaintiffs brought suit in Cobb County where the defendant
had an agent supervising the development of a subdivision. The defen31. GA.CODE ANN. § 22-404(d) (1970) renumbered § 22-404(f); Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 583-588.
32. GA.CODE ANN. § 22-404(b), (1970).
33. 134 Ga.App. 801, 216 S.E.2d 662 (1975).
34. See Boyer v. King, 134 Ga.App. 692, 215 S.E.2d 722 (1975). In Boyer, the defendant
denied venue, and court held the burden was on him to prove lack of venue.
35. GA.CoDE ANN. § 22-5301 (1970) repealed by Ga. Laws, 1975, p. 583.
36. 134 Ga.App. 659, 215 S.E.2d 714 (1975).
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dant's registered agent was in Dekalb County. Relying on General Reduc7
the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
tion Co. v. Tharpe,1
The court of appeals reversed and distinguished the Tharpe case, stating
that the defendant there had maintained an office, superintendent, numerous employees, and a place for the transaction of business. In Redi
Development, on the other hand, the defendant had only a superintendent
in Cobb County, and this one agent was "insufficient to confer jurisdiction."3 8 The court construed the requirement of an office in old §22-5301
to mean more than one agent in a supervisory capacity. In distinguishing
Tharpe, the court appears to be emphasizing both the permanence of the
corporation at the location in question as well as the extent of the corporate
activity there.
The Corporation Code has specific statutory provisions that control the
venue of actions against business entities that are incorporated. The
constitution 39 itself, on the other hand, controls the venue of actions
brought against partnerships. 0 In Nelson Associates, Ltd. v. Grubbs," the
court of appeals sanctioned the use of the Long-Arm Act in conjunction
with Georgia Code §2-4904 to fix venue in Sumter County where "business
was transacted" against both non-Georgia defendants and a Georgia defendant who resided in Dade County. The non-resident defendants in the
limited partnership were residents of New Jersey and Pennsylvania; the
partnership owned land in Sumter County and the contract with the plaintiff was to be performed there. Venue was proper in Sumter County under
the Long-Arm Act as to the three non-resident defendants.12 However, the
general partner was a Georgia resident from Dade County who sought the
dismissal of the action because none of the defendants was a resident of
Sumter County, and as a resident of Dade County, he was entitled to be
sued there.
The court relied on the 1946 decision of Quinton v. American Thread
Co.43 to affirm that venue was proper in Sumter County: "a non-resident
corporation is for the purposes of suit a resident of the county of this State
37. 11 Ga.App. 334, 75 S.E. 339 (1912).
38. 134 Ga.App. at 660, 215 S.E.2d at 715 (1975).
39. GA.CODE ANN. §2-4904 (1973) provides that "Suits against joint obligors, joint promisers, copartners, or joint trespassers residing in different counties, may be tried in either
county." See GA.CoDE ANN. § 3-204 (1975).
40. See Farmers Hardware v. L.A. Properties, Ltd., 136 Ga.App. 180, 220 S.E.2d 465
(1975). The court in Farmers Hardware held that a limited partnership could only be sued
in a county where one of the partners resided. It could not be sued in county where it was
doing business if none of the partners resided there. Although Ga.Code Ann. § 3-120 uses the
"where doing business" test for venue against unincorporated associations, limited partnerships are subject to the principles governing venue against partnerships generally.
41. 135 Ga.App. 947, 219 S.E.2d 607 (1975).
42. See GA.CODE ANN. § 24-116 (1971) which fixes venue against nonresidents "in any
county wherein the business was transacted, the act or omission occurred, or the real property
is located."
43. 74 Ga.App. 436, 40 S.E.2d 95 (1946).
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in which it has an office, agent, and place of business, and an action will
lie against such corporation and a resident joint defendant tort-feasor in
such county, even though the resident joint tort-feasor resides in a different
county."" The court refused in Nelson to apply a different rule to resident
and non-resident partners, and permitted a Georgia resident to be sued in
a county where the Long-Arm Act fixed venue for a non-resident partner."
The reasoning in the Nelson decision is in direct conflict with the 1950
case of Hays v. Jones." There the plaintiff attempted to utilize the constitutional joint tortfeasor rule to acquire venue over a Georgia resident in
the county where venue was proper as to a non-Georgia defendant under
the 1947 version of the Non-Resident Motorist Statute.47 The court of
appeals in Hays v. Jones stated that the joint tortfeasor rule in §2-4904
referred "only to resident joint trespassers" and that the Non-Resident
Motorist Act did not authorize a Georgia resident to be sued outside the
county of his residence. 48 The Non-Resident Motorist Act was later
amended explicitly to create a third place of alternative venue in the
county of the residence of the Georgia co-defendant.48
Nelson thus goes against the well-entrenched attitude of the Georgia
courts in viewing a defendant's right to be sued in his county of residence
as almost a birthright. Because Nelson does not discuss or ever cite Hays,
one can only conclude that for now the joint tortfeasor exception is applicable only to suits where personal jurisdiction is founded on the Long-Arm
Statute and not where jurisdiction is obtained under the Non-Resident
Motorist Act. 0
Another difference between venue obtainable under the Long-Arm Statute and that possible under the Non-Resident Motorist Act is neatly illustrated by Chapman v. Latex Filler & Chemical Co.51 Plaintiff, a resident
44. Id. at 436, 40 S.E.2d at 95.
45. There is no suggestion in the opinion whether venue would be proper in the reverse
situation. If, for instance, venue were proper in Dade County as to a Georgia resident, could
non-Georgia copartners or joint tortfeasors be pulled into that county under GA.CODE ANN. §
2-4904 even though the Long-Arm Statute specifically placed venue for the action against
them in another county where the business was transacted or the tortious act was committed?
Such a result seemingly does less violence to the strong constitutional principle that a Georgia
resident has a right to be sued in the county of his residence than does the result in Nelson.
Yet, an amendment to GA.CODE ANN. § 24-116 may be necessary to allow such an action to
succeed.
46. 81 Ga.App. 597, 59 S.E.2d 404 (1950).
47. Georgia Laws 1947, p. 305, 306, provided that actions against nonresident motorists
"shall be brought in the county in which the accident, injury, or cause of action originated,
or in the county of the residence of the plaintiff, [if a resident of Georgia]."
48. 81 Ga.App. at 598, 59 S.E.2d at 40.
49. 1950 Ga. Laws, 1955, p. 650.
50. A possible explanation for such different results under the two laws may be the
wording of Long-Arm Statute itself that a "court ... may exercise personal jurisdiction over
any nonresident, . . . in the same manner as if he were a resident of the State.
...
GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-113.1 (1971).
51. 135 Ga.App. 665, 218 S.E.2d 671 (1975).
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of Polk County, sued the defendant, a resident of Whitfield County, in
Whitfield County for damages sustained in an automobile collision in Polk
County. The defendant then sought to implead the driver of plaintiff's
vehicle who was a resident of Alabama as a third-party defendant. The
defendant had wisely asserted personal jurisdiction over the Alabama resident under the Non-Resident Motorist Act. Accordingly, the court held
venue was proper in Whitfield County because under that statute venue
may be laid in the county where the plaintiff resides and, for the purposes
of the third-party complaint, the defendant is a third-party plaintiff.
If, on the other hand, the defendant had asserted personal jurisdiction
over the Alabama resident under the Long-Arm Statute, venue would have
been improper in Whitfield County for the impleader action. Venue under
this statute is laid in the county where the tortious act occurred, and, in
the instant case, that was Polk County and not Whitfield. Thus, Chapman
demonstrates how venue needs may require careful consideration before
choosing between two seemingly equally efficacious means of asserting
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident.
An interesting problem involving the constitutional joint tortfeasor rule
in §2-4904 was decided by the court of appeals in Daniel & Daniel, Inc. v.
Cosmopolitan Co. 52 Here plaintiff brought suit in DeKalb County and
defendant sought dismissal contending that it was not a resident of DeKalb. Plaintiff then amended its complaint to add as a new party a second
defendant who was a resident of DeKalb. The court held that defects in
venue could be cured by adding another party so long as the allegations of
the complaint assert claims bringing §2-4904 into play.
Two cases decided during this survey period confirm the continued applicability of the principle of Warren v. Rushing." In Steding Pile Driving
Corp. v. John H. Cunningham & Assoc.," an action was brought in Dougherty County against a resident of that county and a Fulton County resident. The jury verdict was in favor of the Dougherty County resident and
against the Fulton County resident. Accordingly, the verdict against the
Fulton County resident was properly set aside by the trial court because
the court had thereby lost jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant.
The court of appeals in affirming this decision also refused to find any
waiver of personal jurisdiction by the defendant's earlier appearance,
pleading, or failure to object to a jury charge to the effect that the jury
might find against either or both of the defendants.
The case of Henry v. Mann55 extends the principle of Steding to examine
the impact such a decision, and the setting aside of the verdict, has on a
later action against the same defendants in another county. As in Steding,
52.
53.
54.
55.

137
144
137
134

Ga.App.
Ga. 612,
Ga.App.
Ga.App.

383, 224 S.E.2d 44 (1976).
87 S.E. 775 (1916).
165, 223 S.E.2d 217 (1976).
522, 215 S.E.2d 286 (1975).
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the original action against the non-resident defendant resulted in an arrest
of judgment because venue and jurisdiction were lost when the verdict was
in favor of the two resident defendants on whom venue against the nonresident was predicated. Plaintiff then re-instituted the suit against all
defendants in Rockdale County, where the defendant, against whom the
verdict was returned in the first action, resided. The trial court sustained
a plea of res judicata as to all defendants.
In holding that the Rockdale County resident's plea should be denied,
the court of appeals stated, "The arrest of judgment, the court having lost
jurisdiction of him, was equivalent to his dismissal as a party defendant
because of lack of jurisdiction, and the plaintiff is entitled to renew this
suit against him in Rockdale County.""6 The pleas of the two non-resident
defendants in the second action were sustained because the court in the
first action possessed jurisdiction over them and, as to them, the verdict
and judgment in the former action were final.
The supreme court dealt with a question of appellate jurisdiction which
bore indirectly on the issue of venue in cases respecting title to land. In
Graham v. Tallent57 the court attempted to conform constitutional appellate jurisdiction with the constitutional requirements for venue in the trial
of actions. The supreme court's jurisdiction of cases respecting title to land
excludes those cases described rather circularly by the court as those
"which must be brought in the county of residence of a defendant." '
Graham cites Bond v. Ray5 l to illustrate those matters included within the
meaning of "cases respecting title to land," i.e., "actions at law, such as
ejectment and statutory substitutes, in which the plaintiff asserts a presently enforceable legal title against the possession of the defendant for the
purpose of recovering the land."' 0
56. Id. at 522-3, 215 S.E.2d at 287.
57. 235 Ga. 47, 21*8 S.E.2d 799 (1975).
58. Id. at 50, 218 S.E.2d at 802.
59. 207 Ga. 559, 63 S.E.2d 399 (1951).
60. 235 Ga. at 49, 218 S.E.2d at 801. Two other venue cases worth noting were decided in
this survey period. In Mercer v. Doe, 134 Ga.App. 818, 216 S.E.2d 339 (1975), plaintiff brought
an action under the Uninsured Motorist Statute, GA.CODE ANN. § 56-407.1 (1971) in his own
county against John Doe. The insurance company was properly served, but a dismissal was
granted because the statute made no provisions for venue in this type action. The court of
appeals reversed, relying on the dissent in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Godfrey, 120
Ga.App. 560, 171 S.E.2d 735 (1969). The discussion in that case admits the lack of venue
provisions in § 56-407.1 but finds authority for venue in the county of plaintiff's residence in
GA.CODE ANN. § 56-1201, which allows suit where the person entitled to insurance proceeds
maintains his residence.
Smith v. State, 234 Ga. 390, 216 S.E.2d 111, (1975), was a habeas corpus action. The court
held that when a prisoner is restrained by federal authorities in another state, proper jurisdiction for his habeas corpus action is the court in which he was sentenced.
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A. Inherent Power Of The Court
There has been a noticeable resurgence of feeling among some members
of the supreme court of the need to claim and assert the inherent judicial
powers of the courts. This feeling was manifested clearly this year in two
decisions.
In Hall v. Hopper,"' a case borrowed from the area of criminal procedure
for illustrative purposes, the supreme court, in reviewing a petition for writ
of habeas corpus, announced the death of the full-bench rule. This rule
originated in a Code section enacted in 1896 requiring unanimous approval
to reverse a prior unanimous decision. The court had continued the fullbench doctrine as a matter of policy even after its ruling in Ward v. Big
Apple Super Markets of Bolton Road, Inc. 2 that its statutory basis was
legally non-existent once the Constitution of 1945 withdrew the power of
the General Assembly to "enact regulations governing the manner in which
''63 Citing difficulties in
this court could hear and determine cases ...
administering the rule while conceding that stability and certainty are
desirable, the court in Hall v. Hopper ruled that "a majority vote of the
members of this court controls the ruling and judgment in each case . . .
The 'full-bench rule' has been repealed.""4 Although the full-bench rule
died unnoticed in 1945, the court felt compelled to give it a public burial.
In the per curiam opinion in Doyal Development Co. v. Blair, 5 the court
defined C.P.A. rule 5266 as making mandatory the requirement that findings of fact and law be made in certain actions tried without a jury in a
superior court. The decision features interesting concurring and dissenting
opinions discussing the constitutionality of rule 52. Justice Gunter, joined
by Justices Ingram and Hall, expressed the view that the General Assembly had the constitutional power to provide for uniformity in the courts by
enacting the C.P.A., citing §2-4401.11 Justice Undercofler and Chief Justice
Nichols dissented because the majority decision in their view conflicted
with the 1966 decision in CTC Finance Corp. v. Holden." In Holden the
court construed the word "shall" in a statute "9 providing that the trial
judge "shall state the grounds for a new trial" to be merely directory and
not mandatory because the constitutional provision of separation of powers
required that the power to grant new trials be in the courts and not the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

234 Ga. 625, 216 S.E.2d 839 (1975).
223 Ga. 756, 158 S.E.2d 396 (1967).
Id. at 764, 158 S.E.2d at 402.
234 Ga. at 631-32, 216 S.E.2d at 843.
234 Ga. 261, 215 S.E.2d 471 (1975).
GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-152 (1972).
GA.CODE ANN. § 2-4401 (1973).
221 Ga. 809, 147 S.E.2d 427 (1966).
GA.CODE ANN. § 2-123 (1973).
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General Assembly. If the act were construed as mandatory, it would be
unconstitutional. This same reasoning, argued the dissenters, should also
be applicable to the language of rule 52. It should be read as merely
directory rather than mandatory to avoid the constitutional problem of
interfering with the inherent powers of the trial courts in making findings.70
B.

Undermining Uniformity

One case handed down this year poses a serious threat of undermining
the uniformity created by the C.P.A. in municipal courts of record. In
Sellers v. Home FurnishingCo. ,",the supreme court upheld an order denying plaintiffs' request that certain judgments against them be declared
void on the ground that the process and procedure in the Municipal Court
of Savannah did not comply with the provisions of the C.P.A. Sellers is in
apparent conflict with Gresham v. Symmers,7 where the supreme court
earlier had held that the Civil and Criminal Court of DeKalb County was
a court of record, and therefore it was automatically covered by the provisions of the C.P.A. The Gresham court, citing Georgia Code §2-4401, announced that having made the DeKalb court a court of record, "[tihe
legislature cannot, then proceed to declare that the practice in some courts
7
of record shall be different.
However, this is precisely what the supreme court in Sellers found the
legislature had the power to do. The difference seems to lie in another
provision of the Constitution which authorized the General Assembly to
create courts like the Municipal Court of Savannah. Georgia Code §2-4201
allows such courts to be created in cities of populations over 20,000 and
authorizes the General Assembly to provide rules and procedures for the
new courts, exempting such courts from the uniformity provision of §24401, which the Gresham court had found dispositive. The supreme court
in Sellers thus found constitutional authority for local variance in rules of
procedure and further ruled that because the local act 7 creating the procedure for handling claims in the Savannah Municipal Court was enacted
subsequently to the C.P.A., the later local rule controlled in case of conflict
with the earlier, but general, C.P.A. The decision concludes that the lack
of uniformity in these small claims courts throughout the state is unfortunate, but the remedy lies with the General Assembly. Because Gresham was
70. Pinyan v. Pinyan, 235 Ga. 847, 222 S.E.2d 36 (1976), reiterated the principle that a
trial court has inherent power to set aside its own judgment rendered in the same term.
Because this is an inherent power of the court, it was not changed by the C.P.A. However,
Cagle v. Dixon, 234 Ga. 698, 217 S.E.2d 598 (1975), demonstrated that during a succeeding
term, the trial court may only modify its judgment as permitted by the C.P.A.
71. 235 Ga. 831, 222 S.E.2d 34 (1976).
72. 227 Ga. 616, 182 S.E.2d 764 (1971).
73. Id. at 618, 182 S.E.2d at 766.
74. Ga. Laws, 1969, p. 2859.
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not cited by Sellers, one is left to wonder whether conflicting local rules of
practice adopted before the C.P.A. are also to be given effect now.
C.

Union of Law and Equity

75 concerned the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme
Herring v. Ferrell
court. A direct appeal was made to that court because the suit was a class
action which historically grew out of equity practice. Jurisdiction in such
cases, ruled Herring, is to be determined by the questions raised on appeal;
class actions are not automatically to be treated as cases in equity and
hence within the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction. The same test
would be applicable, of course, in determining the subject-matter jurisdiction of trial courts. Class actions could thus be brought in state courts if
only monetary damages were sought."6
IV.

SERVICE OF PROCESS

A.

Reasonable Notice

In Allan v. Allan," the supreme court declared Georgia's historic year's
support procedure unconstitutional on due process grounds. The statutory
notice provisions7" failed to insure notice reasonably calculated to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.
In Allan the defendant wife and the deceased, her former husband, were
married for more than 37 years when they were divorced. While married
they acquired title as tenants in common to a dwelling house in Fulton
County. Each continued to own an undivided one-half interest in the property after the divorce, and the defendant wife continued to live in the
house.
Following his divorce, the deceased married a new wife, the plaintiff, and
died in Cobb County a short time later. In his will, the deceased left his
undivided one-half interest in the Fulton County home to his ex-wife. He
named his new wife as executrix of his estate.
The plaintiff, the second wife, did not offer the will for probate but filed
an application for year's support in the Probate Court of Cobb County.
Following the statutory notice by local newspaper publication, the Cobb
County Probate Court awarded the second wife her husband's one-half
undivided interest in the Fulton County house. The first wife received no
actual notice of the year's support proceedings and learned of the award
75. 234 Ga. 620, 216 S.E.2d 862 (1975).
76. Cf. Adler v. Ormond, 224 Ga. 430, 162 S.E.2d 353, rev'g., 117 Ga.App. 600, 161 S.E.2d
435 (1968).
77. 236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2e 445 (1976).
78. GA.CODE ANN. §§ 113-1002 and 1005 (1975).
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of one-half her home to the plaintiff only when the plaintiff filed an action
to partition the property and divide the proceeds of the sale between them.
The supreme court first determined that a devisee of property under an
unprobated will does have a legally protected interest in such property
even though that interest may be inchoate rather than vested. Accordingly,
procedural due process guarantees applied to protect the first wife's interest in her former husband's devise of his share of their residence. Secondly,
the court ruled, citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,79
that notice by publication is not constitutionally sufficient where the name
and address of interested claimants are known so that notice by mail could
be given. Thus, where an estate is unrepresented, notice by publication
must be supplemented by mailing notice of the application for year's support to those identifiable and known parties having interests in the deceased's property.
Although Allan v. Allan serves as an important reminder of the basic
constitutional rules for giving reasonable notice, a second feature should
not be overlooked. Prior Georgia decisions seemed to draw a sharp distinction between the standard of notice applicable for in personam actions as
opposed to that required for in rem actions. 0 The supreme court in Allan
clearly rejected that approach and refused to characterize the year's support proceeding as one in rem in order to justify using a less sure means of
giving notice. Citing Mullane again, the court stated:
[Tihe characterization of a proceeding as "in rem" or "quasi-in-rem" is
not in itself determinative of the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . As previously stated, due process requires "that deprivation
of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."'"
Apparently, where the name and address of interested parties are
known, appropriate notice means notice by mail, not newspaper publication .2
B.

Service and the Statute of Limitations

Section 4(C) of the C.P.A. provides, "When service is to be made within
79. 339 U.S. 306 (1949).
80. Compare Womble v. Commercial Credit Corp., 231 Ga. 569, 203 S.E.2d 204 (1974)
(leaving process at unattended, most notorious place of abode violates due process in in
personam action), with Pelletier v. Northbrook Garden Apartments, 233 Ga. 208, 210 S.E.2d
722 (1974) (service by tacking notice to door permissible in quasi-in-rem action such as
landlord's dispossessory action). See generally, Beaird and Ellington, Trial Practice and
Procedure, 27 MER. L. REV. 235, 244-45 (1975).
81. 236 Ga. at 205, 223 S.E.2d at 450.
82. Because Allan did not overrule Pelletier v. Northbrook Garden Apartments, supra
note 80, but rather cites it for the appropriate notice standard, one may assume that service
by tacking may survive Allan but only in the context of the landlord and tenant relationship.
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this State, the person making such service shall make such service within
five days from the time of receiving the summons and complaint; but
failure to make service within such five-day period will not invalidate a
later service." 3 The question presented in Childs v. Catlin4 was whether
service must be perfected within five days to toll the statute of limitations
if the statute runs between filing the action and service. Plaintiff filed suit
on July 25, 1974, and plaintiff's attorney was advised the next day that
service had been perfected. One month later, after the statute of limitations had run, the attorney was notified that the defendant had filed a
motion to quash service and a motion to dismiss because the defendant was
not personally served. The deputy sheriff serving the process had merely
left a copy of the summons and complaint at defendant's residence. The
court of appeals in Childs clarified its earlier decision in Hilton v. Maddox,
Bishop, Hayton Frame & Trim Contractors, Inc.5 Although laches would
authorize a court to dismiss an action filed within the statute if service
were unduly prolonged, the five-day period mentioned in rule 4(c) is not
the limit where "the plaintiff showed that he acted in a reasonable and
diligent manner in attempting to insure that a proper service was made
as quickly as possible."86
Another case concerning diligence in perfecting service, Delcher Brothers Storage Co. v. Ward, 7 was also decided during this period. Here, plaintiffs commenced a tort action on January 4, 1973, but service of process
on the Secretary of State was not made until July 1, 1974, well after the
statute of limitations had run. The defendant was a nonresident motor
carrier; the designated agent for service of process could not accept service
because he was ill. The plaintiffs' counsel attempted several times to determine whether another agent had been appointed and, when informed that
the agent had died, promptly served the Secretary of State. The court of
appeals refused to find that the trial court had abused its discretion in
denying the motion to dismiss. The court speculated that while the plaintiffs' counsel might have been more diligent in weighing the equities, defendant's failure to maintain an agent for a year and a half must be considered.8 1
Moore v. Tootle8 presents an interesting case on the interplay between
Georgia Code §3-808, the statute of limitations, and the involuntary dis83. GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-104(c) (1972).
84. 134 Ga.App. 778, 216 S.E.2d 360 (1975).
85. 125 Ga.App. 423, 188 S.E.2d 167 (1972).
86. 134 Ga.App. at 781, 216 S.E.2d at 362.
87. 134 Ga.App. 686, 215 S.E.2d 516 (1975).
88. In McNeal v. Able, 135 Ga.App. 702, 218 S.E.2d 460 (1975), the court held that failure
to serve two of three defendants for more than five years after suit was filed was inexcusable
neglect and reversed the judgment of the trial court denying dismissal. Judge Deen dissented
because the failure to serve process was due to the negligence of the sheriffs department.
89. 134 Ga.App. 232, 214 S.E.2d 184 (1975).
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missal rule. Plaintiffs originally filed a complaint in Gwinnett County,

residence of the defendant doctor. Later, they decided to join a drug company as a defendant that was only subject to jurisdiction in Fulton County.
The plaintiffs dismissed the Gwinnett County action and filed in Fulton
County against the drug company and the original defendant as joint
tortfeasors. The second suit was commenced within the statute of limitations. When the drug company was dismissed from the action on its motion
for summary judgment, jurisdiction was no longer proper as to the Gwinnett County defendant in Fulton County. The statute of limitations, however, had now run. Within six months of the termination of the Fulton
County action, plaintiffs refiled against the original defendant in Gwinnett. The defendant doctor's motion for summary judgment was granted
on the grounds that the statute of limitations now barred the action.
The court of appeals reversed citing Georgia Code §3-808.1" This statute provides that an action can be renewed one time if refiled within six
months after dismissal and the effective date of the renewal will be that
of the original action for the purpose of the statute of limitations. The court
noted that while the privilege could be exercised only once, the plaintiffs
had not been exercising that privilege when the first Gwinnett County
action was dismissed and renewed in Fulton County because the statute
of limitations had not then run. Section 3-808 applies only to cases which
otherwise would be barred by the statute of limitations. The court concluded that "[slince §3-808 applies to involuntary as well as voluntary
dismissals, so long as the grounds for dismissal do not adjudicate the
merits

. . .

plaintiffs were entitled to renew this suit in the Gwinnett court

within six months after the Fulton County suit terminated for lack of
jurisdiction. . .

."

C. Rule 5 and Service on Counsel
The supreme court construed rule 5 of the C.P.A. to require notice to
party's counsel where such counsel had made an appearance although no
pleadings were filed. In Moss v. Bishop" the plaintiffs sought to have the
verdict and judgment in a prior suit set aside. The first suit had been
brought by Bishop against the Mosses to recover an undivided one-half
interest in real estate. The counsel for the Mosses consented to a temporary
order restraining them from disposing of the property. The supreme court
found that this constituted an appearance even though no defensive pleadings were filed by the defendants in the first action. Moreover, this "ap90. GA.CODE ANN. § 3-808 (1975) provides: "If a plaintiff shall discontinue or dismiss his
case, and shall recommence within six months, such renewal case shall stand upon the same
footing, as to limitation, with the original case; but this privilege of dismissal and renewal
shall be exercised only once under this section."
91. 134 Ga.App. at 234, 214 S.E.2d at 185-6.
92. 235 Ga. 616, 221 S.E.2d 38 (1975).
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pearance" entitled the defendants to notice of future proceedings in the
case through their counsel. The failure of the plaintiff in the original action
to notify the opposing counsel of a request that the case be placed on the
trial calendar, placing the case on the calendar without notice, and filing
an amendment to the complaint without service on counsel for defendants
required that the original defendant be allowed in this action to set aside
and vacate the first judgment."
V.

A.

PLEADINGS AND MOTIONS

PleadingMedical Malpractice

The General Assembly enacted legislation effective September 6, 1976,
which amends both rule 8 and rule 54 of the C.P.A. to make special provisions for medical malpractice claims." The amendment to rule 8 provides
that if the pleader is making a medical malpractice claim for $10,000 or
less, a demand for judgment in a sum certain must be included. However,
if the malpractice claim exceeds $10,000, the pleader must state only that
he demands judgment in excess of $10,000 and no further amount may be
stated. The amendment to rule 54 authorizes a judgment in the event of
default of a claim exceeding $10,000 in an amount determined by a trial
on the issue of damages, provided notice consistent with amended rule 54
has been given. The basic notion of rule 54(c) was unchanged, i.e., that
except in default cases, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which
the party is entitled even if the pleader has not demanded such relief in
the pleadings.
This amendment appears to make the prescribed prayer for relief a
necessary part of a claim for medical malpractice. In Allied Asphalt Co.
v. Cumbie, 5 the court of appeals construed unamended rule 54(c) to mean
that the demand for judgment was not part of the pleader's cause of action.
This, of course, is the basic rule. The issue there was whether the plaintiff's
original complaint, lacking a prayer for in personam relief, satisfied all the
prerequisites for the later foreclosure of a materialman's lien, namely the
commencement of an in personam action within the specified time. Be93. In situations where a party changes counsel, the clerk of the court's office is only
required to send notice to the attorney of record at the time of the mailing. If the attorney of
record changes subsequent to the mailing, the clerk is not required to send another notice to
new counsel. The court of appeals held in Tallman Pools of Georgia, Inc. v. Napier, 137
Ga.App. 500, 224 S.E.2d 426 (1976), that the defendant did have notice of the trial even
though it was mailed to an attorney who had withdrawn from the case, notice of the change
having been received in the clerk's office subsequent to the mailing. Miller v. Georgia Real
Estate Commission, 136 Ga.App. 718, 222 S.E.2d 183 (1975), demonstrated that GA. CODE
ANN. §81A-106(b) (1972) does not apply to late filings where the time period is fixed by a
statute other than the C.P.A.
94. Ga. Laws 1976, pp 1047-50.
95. 134 Ga.App. 960, 216 S.E.2d 659 (1975).
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cause plaintiff's complaint set forth a claim for in personam relief, the
failure to demand such relief was irrelevant. Plaintiff could receive all the
relief to which the evidence showed that he was entitled.
B.

PleadingNegligence

Both the court of appeals and the supreme court considered the case of
Dillingham v. Doctors' Clinic, P.A.96 and the issue of pleading negligence.
The plaintiff's pro se complaint alleged that the defendant doctors performed surgery of "a questionable nature" on plaintiff's wife thereby injuring plaintiff by materially affecting his marital and conjugal relationship.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal for failure to
state a claim. Relying on White v. Augusta Motel Hotel Investment Co.,97
the court of appeals held that at least a general allegation of "negligence"
was necessary. The supreme court reversed disapproving the decision in
White and approving the ruling in Beaver v. Southern Greyhound Lines,
Inc." that the "absence of a general allegation of negligence will not subject
the petition to dismissal . . ." so long as sufficient facts are disclosed from
which negligence can be inferred."
According to the supreme court in Dillingham, because the C.P.A. substituted "notice pleading" for "issue pleading", it must appear to the court
beyond a doubt that there is no set of facts that the plaintiff can prove that
will entitle him to relief before an action should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim:
In our opinion it cannot be said as a matter of law that it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff will not be able to prove facts at the trial to entitle
him to relief under his claim. It must be remembered that the objective
of the CPA is to avoid technicalities and to require only a short and plain
statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and a general indication of the type of litigation involved; the
discovery process bears the burden of filling in details.'"
C.

PleadingFraud

Two recent decisions followed Cochran v. McCollum,"" noted in last
year's article, on the requirements for pleading fraud. 02 In Bryant v.
Bryant,' Justice Hall reiterated that the standard for dismissing a plead96. 135 Ga.App. 736, 219 S.E.2d 2 (1975), rev'd, 236 Ga. 302, 223 S.E.2d 625 (1976).
97. 119 Ga.App. 351, 167 S.E.2d 161 (1969).
98. 120 Ga.App. 576, 171 S.E.2d 658 (1969).
99. Id. at 576, 171 S.E.2d at 659.
100. 236 Ga. at 303, 223 S.E.2d at 626.
101. 233 Ga. 104, 210 S.E.2d 13 (1974).
102. See Beaird and Ellington, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Trial Practice and
Procedure, 27 MER. L. REV. 235, 247 (1975).
103. 236 Ga. 265, 223 S.E.2d 662 (1976).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

ing alleging fraud was the same standard applicable to other pleadings:
that plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. The allegations in Bryant were sufficient to meet this test and the complaint should
not have been dismissed. And, Justice Hill directed in Filsoof v. West'0 4
that when the allegations of fraud meet the Cochran test, the trial court
should treat a motion to strike as a motion for a more definite statement
and thus avoid dismissing the complaint. The great difficulty of why a
complaint that satisfies rule 8 should be subject to a motion to strike at
all was not explained. As feared, the legacy of Cochran may well be to
loosen the constraints on rule 12(e)'s motion for more definite statements.
D. Sufficiency of the Answer
The court in Robinson v. Rearden15 refused to disturb the trial court's
ruling that neither defendant was in default. Since both the corporate
defendant and the individual defendant's name appeared on the pro se
answer, and the answer was sufficient to join issue, the court of appeals
concluded that the trial court was correct in ruling that the answer was
the answer of both defendants.
Although the defense of statute of limitations was not affirmatively
raised in defendants' answer or motions, the court of appeals in Fortierv.
Ramsey,"' found that the defense had not been waived. The defendants
did raise the defense in a brief captioned "Response to Plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment." Moreover, plaintiffs did not object nor claim
unfair surprise.
Rule 11 of the C.P.A. requires the attorney's signature on the pleading,
but the court of appeals in Lee v. Precision Balancing & Machine, Inc."7
directed that the trial court grant leave to comply with this requirement
rather than strike the pleading. An answer which evinces an intent on the
part of the defendant to answer should prevent default even though it
erroneously named defendant's attorney, who signed the answer, as attorney for the plaintiff.
E.

Motions

The supreme court in Ellis v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co.'00 reaffirmed
the general rule that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not properly
granted when there is a question of fact. Plaintiff sought specific performance of a contract to sell property; defendant's answer and motion for
judgment on the pleadings contended the contract was oral, therefore
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

235
134
136
134
234

Ga. 818,
Ga.App.
Ga.App.
Ga.App.
Ga. 355,

221 S.E.2d 811 (1976).
815, 216 S.E.2d 370 (1975).
203, 220 S.E.2d 753 (1975).
762, 216 S.E.2d 640 (1975).
216 S.E.2d 109 (1975).
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unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The trial court granted the
motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, because the plaintiff had
not stated in his pleadings that the contract was oral, an issue of fact was
unresolved and the judgment of the trial court was reversed.
The proper procedure to follow when asserting 12(b) defenses in the
answer, rather than by motion, was outlined by the court of appeals in
Hayes v. SuperiorLeasing Corp. 09 After raising the defense in the answer,
a motion to dismiss on the same grounds is incorrect. The defendant
should seek a preliminary hearing and determination under rule 12(d).11"
If, nevertheless, the motion to dismiss satisfies the provisions of rule 7(b),
it may be treated by the trial court as a request for a preliminary hearing.
As noted in Chatham v. Royal-Globe Insurance Co.,"' a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be used to raise a dilatory
defense. There the court held that the trial court should not have granted
the motion dismissing the third-party defendant insurance company without specifying that the dismissal was without prejudice since it did not go
to the merits.
F.

Counterclaims-Rule 13

In Harbin Lumber Co. v. Fowler,"' the court of appeals construed rule
13(a) of the C.P.A." 3 and interpreted the phrase "arises out of the same
transaction or occurrence." Fowler, the plaintiff in this action, had been
sued in a prior action by the defendant here, Harbin Lumber Co. At that
time, Fowler counterclaimed for personal injuries resulting from the accident which formed the basis of plaintiff's claim. Later Fowler instituted
this separate action seeking recovery for the wrongful death of her daughter
who was killed in the same accident. The defendant moved for judgment
on the pleadings arguing that this action should have been brought as a
compulsory counterclaim in the other suit and was thus barred by the
pendency of that action. The trial court denied the motion, but the court
of appeals reversed.
The crucial language of rule 13(a) is that a counterclaim is compulsory
if it "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim." The court of appeals reasoned that
"[c]ause of action has no express bearing on the issue. The fact that the
plaintiff might have a different status in the second suit as opposed to the
first suit would likewise be of no consequence."" Because the first suit was
109. 136 Ga.App. 98, 220 S.E.2d 86 (1975).
110. GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-112(d) (1972).
111. 135 Ga.App. 59, 217 S.E.2d 308 (1975).
112. 137 Ga.App. 90, 222 S.E.2d 878 (1975).
113. GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-113(a) (1972).
114. 137 Ga.App. at 92, 222 S.E.2d at 880. The Georgia interpretation of rule 13(a) seems
more liberal than the general interpretation of the federal rule counterpart. 6 C. WRIGHT &
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still pending, the court directed thb second action dismissed without prejudice leaving Fowler the right to file her wrongful death action as a counterclaim in the first suit.
The reverse situation of Harbin was presented in Monumental Properties, Inc. v. Johnson;"5 here, the counterclaim was asserted too soon. One
prerequisite in an action to recover damages for malicious use of civil
process is the termination of proceedings in favor of the allegedly abused
defendant. The defendant here interposed his claim for damages for malicious prosecution as a counterclaim in the action allegedly giving rise to
his claim. However, because the plaintiff in the main action did not object
to the counterclaim, the court of appeals remanded for a new trial upon
an amendment to the counterclaim to show the termination of plaintiff's
claim against defendant.
G.

Impleader-Rule 14

The two cases decided during this survey period construing rule 14 of the
C.P.A. dealt with insurance companies in the role of third-party defendants. The first case, National Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. MasseyFerguson Credit Corp."6 discussed the use of rule 14 to implead a credit
life insurer when the holder of retail installment contracts instituted foreclosure action against the debtor's estate. The insurance company contended it could not be impleaded under rule 14 because its liability on a
policy of credit life insurance is owed directly to the creditor and not
secondarily to the original debtor-defendant. The court of appeals reasoned, however, that such an insurance policy was for the benefit of both
creditor and debtor, because "[i]f the estate [of deceased debtor] is
found liable in the main action, the debtor's estate would be subrogated
to the claims of the creditor and the deceased debtor to the benefit of the
credit life insurance.""' 7 The insurance company also maintained that because the creditor sought foreclosure, rather than a money judgment, the
insurer could not be secondarily liable. The court dismissed this contention
by noting that the creditor's ultimate purpose was to enforce its security
interest and collect on its indebtedness. To allow the insured to be put in
default and escape impleader by claiming that the third-party complaint
does not go to plaintiff's claim of foreclosure would frustrate the intent of
impleader. Hence, the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss
the third-party complaint.
The second case considered which party (plaintiff or third-party plainA. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1404, at 19 (1971), indicates only that there
is "some weakening of the general requirement that the parties have the same capacity with
regard to the counterclaim as they do with respect to the original claim."
115. 136 Ga.App. 39, 220 S.E.2d 55 (1975).
116. 136 Ga.App. 311, 220 S.E.2d 793 (1975).
117. Id. at 313, 220 S.E.2d at 795.
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tiff) should receive the proceeds of an insurance policy paid into the registry of the trial court pursuant to a judgment in a third-party action. In
Bishop v. Georgia Baptist Hospital"8 the original defendant properly impleaded its insurer, alleging the insurer was obligated to pay any indebtedness of the defendant to the plaintiff hospital. After a jury trial and verdict
was returned against the insurer, the amount due was paid into the registry
of the court; this amount was sent to the third-party plaintiff, who sent
only part of the amount on to the plaintiff hospital. The hospital sought a
rule nisi to have the full amount paid back into court for its benefit. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order to the original defendant
(third-party plaintiff) to repay the proceeds. The court ruled that the funds
were paid by the insurer for the benefit of the original plaintiff in whose
favor judgment had been rendered against the defendant. This decision is
in keeping with the purpose of impleader which is to avoid a multiplicity
of actions.
H.

Amendments-Rule 15

The entry of a pre-trial order, not merely the holding of a pre-trial
conference, is necessary to cut off a party's right under rule 15(a) to freely
amend. In Altamaha Convalescent Center,Inc. v. Godwin,' 9 the defendant
objected to plaintiff's amending his complaint after the pre-trial conference. The court of appeals ruled that it was the entry of the order that was
determinative; therefore, plaintiff was free to amend as a matter of course
and without leave of court under 15(a).
Rich's, Inc. v. Snyders" posed a classic case for the application of rule
15(c) - the relation back of an amendment to change a party. Plaintiff
filed her suit against Richway, Inc. on the last day before the statute of
limitations ran for personal injuries received in defendant's store. Defendant answered that it did not own, operate, or control the store where the
accident occurred. Plaintiff then amended her complaint two months after
the initial filing to name "Rich's Inc. d/b/a Richway, Inc." as the proper
defendant. Plaintiff's amendment stated that it was being made under
C.P.A. rule 15(c).' 2' Rich's asserted the statute of limitations as a bar to
the action. Discovery proceedings disclosed both corporations had the
same registered agent for service of process, that Richway, Inc. did not
carry liability insurance since it did not operate Richway stores, and further that Rich's insurer had contacted plaintiff, offering a minimum settlement. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the Rich's
motion for summary judgment. The court noted:
118.
119.
120.
121.

136 Ga.App. 507, 221 S.E.2d 682 (1975).
137 Ga.App. 394, 224 S.E.2d 76 (1976).
134 Ga.App. 889, 216 S.E.2d 648 (1975).
GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-115(c) (1972).
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An amendment to a complaint changing the party defendant relates back
to the date of the original pleadings and prevents the statute of limitation
bar provided the following requirements are satisfied: (1) the suit was
commenced within the lawful period; (2) the claim arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence contained in the original complaint; (3)
the new defendant received such notice of the original filing of the action
"within the period provided by law for commencing the action against
him"; (4) this notice is such that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining
his defense on the merits; and (5) the new defendant knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party,
the action would have been brought against him. Ga. Code Ann. §81A115(c).'"

Plaintiff here fulfilled each of these requirements.
A similar situation, requiring the application of rule 15(c), was presented
in George v. Southern Railway Co. "I However, in this case the original
complaint was never served on the defendant. Although the amendment
changing the name of the defendant was properly served, the court of
appeals did not allow it to relate back to the date of the original pleadings,
since there was no valid complaint to which it could relate.
While the provision for relation back has been held to apply to John Doe
complaints, the 1974 decision of Sims v. American Casualty Co. 2 requires
sufficient notice to the actual defendant within the statutory period. Following the rule of Sims, the court of appeals held in Moulden Supply Co.
v. Rojas'25 that the defendant there did not have notice within the statute
of limitations to satisfy the requirements of 15(c) in order to allow the
amendment naming the defendant to relate back to the time of the filing
of the John Doe complaint. The court found nothing in the record to
indicate that the defendant received notice of the action or knew or should
have known that, but for a mistake, the action would have been brought
against him. The defendant presented an affidavit showing that the first
time he became aware of plaintiff's claim was when service was perfected
for the amended complaint.
The primary use of the relation-back provision when parties are changed
is to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. However, its application
is not limited to that situation. In A.H. Robins Co. v. Sullivan,' the
plaintiff attempted to use only the first sentence of rule 15(c) to accomplish
a relation-back. The plaintiff originally brought a malpractice action
against a doctor and a radiologist association in Chatham County; plaintiff
later filed suit against the manufacturer of the medical device, A.H. Robins Co., in Thomas County. Still later, plaintiff amended the first action
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

134
135
131
135
136

Ga.App.
Ga.App.
Ga.App.
Ga.App.
Ga.App.

at 889, 216 S.E.2d at 649.
531, 218 S.E.2d 447 (1975).
461, 206 S.E.2d 121 (1974).
229, 217 S.E.2d 468 (1975).
533, 221 S.E.2d 697 (1975).
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in Chatham County to add the manufacturer, and Robins moved for dismissal citing the pendency of the Thomas County suit against it on the
same claim. The Thomas County suit was subsequently dismissed voluntarily by the plaintiff, and the trial court denied Robins' motion to dismiss
the Chatham County action.
The court of appeals, however, pointed out that the language of 15(c)
requires a change of parties and that the additionof parties who are strangers to the original suit was not included within the concept of "changing."
The court concluded that:
Since §15(c) does not authorize the relation back of an amendment
which adds Robins as a party defendant to the Chatham County suit, we
must conclude that the Thomas County suit preceded the amendment,
and therefore, Robins' defense under Code §3-601 [prior action pending]
is meritorious.'1
The court in Robins relied on the fact that the manufacturer was a
"stranger" to the lawsuit and did not have an "identity of interest" with
the two original defendants. This finding was necessary in view of the

holding of Gordon v. Gillespie.' 8 There the court found that 15(c) applied

to amendments adding plaintiffs as well as defendants. The plaintiff
sought to amend his wrongful death action to add all surviving children of
his father as party plaintiffs. Because the plaintiff had sought recovery for
the "full value" of his father's life, the other surviving children were necessary parties. Following federal and state precedents,'29 the court of appeals
held that the requirements of cause of action and identity of interest were
satisfied, and the amendment added after the statute had run related back
30
to the original filing.
VI.
A.

PARTIES

Class Actions - Rule 23

The case of Sta-Power Industries, Inc. v. Avant'"' presented the court of
127. Id. at 536, 221 S.E.2d at 700.
128. 135 Ga.App. 369, 217 S.E.2d 628 (1975).
129. See Sam Finley, Inc. v. Interstate Fire Ins. Co., 135 Ga.App. 14, 217 S.E.2d 358
(1975), Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234 (5th Cir..1968), DeFranco v. United States,
18 F.R.D. 156 (S.D. Cal. 1955), Holmes v. Pennsylvania New York Central Transp. Co., 48
F.R.D. 449 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
130. In Vaughn v. Collum, 136 Ga.App. 677, 222 S.E.2d 37 (1975), all three divisions of
the court of appeals considered the applicability of 15(c) provisions for relation back when
service of complaint was not perfected upon plaintiff's insurer until after the statute had run.
Relation back was not allowed because the insurer had no notice within the statute as
required. The dissenting opinion argued that an insurer, under a policy for uninsured motorist
coverage, is not a party defendant and not entitled to all protections afforded the defendant.
Additionally, the dissent pointed out that the insurer is in the suit by virtue of its contract
with plaintiff and thus the longer statute of limitations should apply.
131. 134 Ga.App. 952, 216 S.E.2d 897 (1975).
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appeals with an opportunity to interpret rule 23 on class actions and rule
24 on intervention. Here the plaintiff had alleged that the defendant corporation and its officers were selling distributorship agreements in a pyramid
sales scheme in violation of the Georgia Securities Act. The defendants
asserted that the suit could not be maintained as a class action. The court
found that the character of the right to be enforced here was common even
though the claims for damages were separate and distinct, citing numerous
federal cases upholding the right of purchasers of securities or franchise
licensing agreements to sue as a class.' 32 The court found that the prerequisites for a class action under rule 23 were satisfied; namely, a sufficiently numerous class of about 250 Georgia purchasers, common questions
of law or fact, no major antagonistic interests within the class, and claims
of the class directed toward specific property of the defendants.
Addressing the common questions of law and fact prerequisite, the court
stated that common questions predominate "when action is brought on
behalf of purchasers of agreements from a common source, the character
of the right sought to be enforced is common, and common relief is
sought.'1 3 Thus the court of appeals signaled encouragement for consumer
class action suits where purchasers claim to have been defrauded by a
common course of dealing.
The defendants also based their appeal on a court order permitting the
addition of nine intervening plaintiffs after a default judgment was entered
against the defendants for failing to obey a court order compelling answers
to interrogatories. The court of appeals acknowledged that intervention
after judgment was unusual; however, it was within the trial court's discretion to determine whether such application was timely and the basis for
intervention sufficiently compelling.
The reason for adding intervenor plaintiffs was the defendant's failure
to comply with discovery and supply a complete list of all franchise purchasers who were potential members of the class. The court of appeals
noted that if there had been compliance with the trial court's order, the
intervenor plaintiffs would have had an opportunity to join in the litigation
before judgment was entered. Two criteria for allowing such intervention
after judgment were articulated: if intervention is necessary to "preserve
some right which cannot otherwise be protected,""1 4 and if discovery is
unduly delayed by the defendant's failure to comply with discovery re-quests. Although sound on this point, the decision leaves confused and
132. See Harris v. Palm Springs Aline Estates, 329 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1964); McMackin
v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 1005 (1972); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D.
472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Each of these federal court class actions arose under the so-called
spurious class action rule that expressly allows a class action to be maintained where common
questions of law or fact predominate.
133. 134 Ga.App. at 954, 216 S.E.2d 900, 901.
134. Id. at 959, 216 S.E.2d at 903.
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35
unresolved the issue posed sub silento by Herring v. Ferrell1
of whether
these intervenor plaintiffs would have been bound by this judgment as
members of the class even though they did not voluntarily intervene. 13

B.

Substitution of Parties- Rule 25

In a case of first impression, the supreme court interpreted the requirements of rule 25(a)(1) which provides for substitution of parties upon the
death of a party. The court held in Jerniganv. Collier*7 that the dismissal
provided in rule 25, when substitution is not made within the time specified, is not automatic. Such a dismissal requires an order by the trial court.
The trial court has some discretion and, if the party seeking late substitution demonstrates excusable neglect, the court may allow the substitution
even though the specified 180-day period has expired. The court also considered the preclusive effect of such a dismissal:
When the plaintiff has failed to timely move for substitution and has had
a hearing and adverse determination on the issue of excusable neglect, a
dismissal is, as it should be, upon the merits, because there is no reason
or justification for entertaining yet another suit after the matter of excusable neglect has been adjudicated.' u
VII.

DISCOVERY

Under rule 26(b)(3) work product is conditionally protected from discovery. Clarkson Industries Inc. v. Price"'details the showing which must be
made by a party asserting work product immunity. In this personal injury
action, the plaintiff requested through interrogatories the substance of
contents of any report secured by the defendant from eyewitnesses to the
accident. The defendant objected to the interrogatory on the basis of work
product, and the trial court overruled the objection.
The court of appeals noted the two requirements of rule 26 for work
product: (1) the documents must be prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial and (2) the material must contain the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the preparer. Although rule 26
no longer requires that the preparer be an attorney to assert the work
product immunity, the main purpose of the rule still is to protect the
preparer's mental impressions. Thus, when a party seeks the protection of
work product, the burden is on that party to demonstrate that both of these
requirements have been met.
135. 233 Ga. 1, 209 S.E.2d 599 (1974).
136. See Beaird & Ellington, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Trial Practice and
Procedure, 27 MER. L. REV. 235, 253-55 (1975).
137. 234 Ga. 837, 218 S.E.2d 556 (1975).
138. 234 Ga. at 841, 218 S.E.2d at 559.
139. 135 Ga.App. 787, 218 S.E.2d 921 (1975).
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Illustrating its announced test, the court followed a federal case,
which distinguished a situaScourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co. 110
tion where a witness records his observations and mental impressions from
that where a record is made by the party or his representative of an oral
statement by the witness which therefore presumably contains an analysis
and impression of what the witness has said. Thus, Clarkson Industries
Inc. announced that "in order for the statements of witnesses to be exempt
from the general scope of discovery they must have been orally given to a
party or his representative who records it in anticipation of litigation or
trial."'' Because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the statements
were protected as work product, the plaintiff was not required to show
substantial need or undue hardship to obtain the witnesses' statements
through discovery.
The court of appeals in Johnson v. Martin 2 pointed out that the drastic
remedy of dismissal for failure. to allow discovery could not be invoked by
the trial court on its own motion, but required a motion by the party at
interest. The court observed further that the dismissal of a co-defendant
was error because the co-defendant could not be the beneficiary of a dismissal of the plaintiff's action against the other co-defendant caused by
the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the other co-defendant's discovery requests.
The necessity of a court order directing a party to answer requests for
admission, after objection is filed, was demonstrated by ContractManagement Consultants, Inc. v. Huddle House, Inc. 113The plaintiff served interrogatories and requests for admission which the defendant objected. Plaintiff contended that the trial court's order sustaining the objection to one
interrogatory "impliedly overruled" defendant's objections to the other
interrogatories and requests for admission. The court of appeals did not
decide that issue but rested its decision on the failure of the court to enter
an order directingthe defendant to serve an answer, as the court is required
to do by rule 36(a). 14
140. 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
141. 135 Ga.App. at 790-91, 218 S.E.2d at 924 (emphasis in the original).
142. 137 Ga.App. 312, 223 S.E.2d 465 (1976).
143. 134 Ga.App. 566, 215 S.E.2d 326 (1975).
144. An additional discovery case dealt with the need for filing a timely request for an
extension of time to answer interrogatories and requests for admissions. In Osceola Inns v.
State Highway Department, 133 Ga.App. 736, 213 S.E.2d 27 (1975), appellant argued that
the grant of summary judgment was improper because appellant's failure to answer within
the time was "the result of providential cause." While counsel showed the court evidence that
he was hospitalized for part of the time, "[tihere was nothing submitted by counsel to show
that he was prevented from obtaining an extension of time for answering the requests for
admissions, either by himself or through someone connected with his law firm." 133 Ga.App.
at 738, 213 S.E.2d at 29. Finding no providential cause or excusable neglect, the appellate
court affirmed the trial judge's disallowance of the late responses.
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VIII.
A.

JUDGMENT AND TRIAL

Jury Trial -

Rules 39 and 40

The supreme court in Bullock v. Bullock "5 found no error in the trial
court permitting a jury trial when a written demand for jury trial was not
timely filed. The court reasoned that because rule 39 permits the trial court
to order a jury trial even though expressly waived by the parties, the court
was also empowered to order a trial when a party's demand was filed late.
The General Assembly added a provision to rule 40(a) effective April 7,
1976, which alters the time for trial in divorce cases following service by
publication. As amended, rule 40(a) now reads:
(a) Time of Trial. All civil cases, including divorce and other domestic relations cases, shall be triable anytime after the last day upon which
defensive pleadings were required to be filed thereon; provided however,
the Court shall in all cases afford to the parties reasonable time for discovery procedures, subsequent to the date that such defensive pleadings were
required to be filed; provided, further, that in divorce cases involving
service by publication, service shall occur on the date of the first publication of notice following the order for service of publication pursuant to the
provisions of section 4(e)(1)(iii), and such divorce cases shall be triable
anytime after 60 days have elapsed since the date of such first publication
of notice.'"

B.

Dismissals - Rule 41

A dismissal under rule 41(b) operates as an adjudication on the merits
unless the order of dismissal specifies otherwise. In Trice v. Howard,"7 the
supreme court considered the effect of such a dismissal upon a later suit
on a different cause of action between the same parties. In 1972, Trice
initiated an action against Howard seeking injunctive relief and damages
for trespass to certain land. Trice alleged he was the owner in fee of certain
property and that Howard was removing pulpwood from it. Howard's answer admitted the removal of pulpwood, but denied Trice's ownership of
the land. This first suit was dismissed pursuant to 41(b) for want of prosecution when Trice neither in person nor through counsel appeared for trial.
Because the trial court did not specify otherwise, the dismissal operated
as an adjudication on the merits. The court's order specifically stated that
"[tihe prayers of the complainant are denied and judgment is hereby
awarded against the plaintiff for the cost of this action.""'
In 1974 Howard, the defendant in the first action, brought suit against
Trice seeking injunctive relief and damages for trespass on the same land.
145.
146.
147.
148.

234 Ga. 253, 215 S.E.2d 255 (1975).
Ga. Laws, 1976, pp. 1677-78.
234 Ga. 189, 214 S.E.2d 907 (1975).
Id. at 190, 214 S.E.2d at 909.
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The trial court ruled that the prior suit had vested title in Howard and its
order was certified for immediate review.
The supreme court recognized that Howard's present suit was based on
a separate cause of action from Trice's earlier claim against Howard so that
the principles of res judicata did not apply. However, the court considered
whether such a dismissal nevertheless established facts to which an estoppel by judgment could be applied. The court held:
Dismissal for want of prosecution establishes against the dismissed party
any matters of fact framed by the pleadings in the former litigation which
it would have been necesssary to decide to render a judgment "on the
merits" in favor of the opposing party. This holding is consistent with the
purpose of § 81A-141(b), which is to make available a stiff sanction
against plaintiffs who fail to prosecute claims in filed cases. Whether to
impose this sanction, of course, remains within the discretion of the trial
judge under his authority to provide in the order of dismissal that it shall
not operate as an adjudication on the merits. 4
Thus, the court seems to be treating the dismissal of Trice's lawsuit for his
failure to prosecute as determining, in effect, that Howard had title.
Justice Gunter, joined by Justice Ingram, filed a dissent. They dealt
with the facts that were actually adjudicated. The trial court's language
stated that "the prayers of the complaint are denied." In Justice Gunter's
view, the judgment did not adjudicate ownership but only that Trice was
not entitled to the relief he sought. Therefore neither res judicata nor
collateral estoppel could be relied on to fully and finally settle the issues
in the second suit. The dissent points out that in federal practice a dismissal, although with prejudice, cannot establish facts to which collateral
estoppel can later be applied where no facts are actually adjudicated. The
dissent is surely correct. By failing to prosecute his claim for trespass, Trice
might expect to forego his claim for damages; he would hardly expect to
learn that he has thereby forfeited his land.
A very recent case, Deal v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R.,' 50 considered the
constitutionality of rule 41(a). The trial court had ruled the provision
unconstitutional where the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed the case
after the jury had deliberated several hours. The.supreme court reversed,
holding that the defendants were not deprived of the right to trial by jury,
equal protection, or due process. The time at which the right to dismiss
voluntarily is cut off is determined solely by rules of procedure, and rule
41(a) allows the plaintiff to dismiss at any time before verdict.
English v. Atlanta Transit System, Inc. "'tdefined the correct procedure
to be followed by a plaintiff who seeks a voluntary dismissal. This case also
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 192, 214 S.E.2d at 910.
236 Ga. 629, 224 S.E.2d 922 (1976).
134 Ga.App. 621, 215 S.E.2d 304 (1975).
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involved the effect of prior litigation between the parties on the present
action. In the original suit, plaintiff attempted to gain a voluntary dismissal prior to verdict. The trial judge refused to accept plaintiff's request,
apparently on the basis that the plaintiff moved for dismisal rather than
gave notice, as the words of rule 41(a) require.
The court of appeals held that under the notice system of the C.P.A.,
the plaintiff's pleadings sufficiently informed the court of her intent. However, rule 5(e) does not require the judge to accept papers filed with him.
When the judge refused to permit the filing, the plaintiff should have
exercised her right to file with the clerk of the court. Plaintiff acceded to
the trial court's refusal by failing to obtain a ruling as to the legal sufficiency of her request, by failing to amend or make an objection to the court
for not dismissing the jury, and by failing to take an appeal. The court
found the plaintiff estopped to complain of the judgment later entered
against her in that case. The present attempt to file the voluntary dismissal and reinstitute the suit was barred and summary judgment was
properly granted for the defendant on the principle of res judicata.
In Grier v. Wade Ford, Inc.,'152 the court of appeals held that payment
of costs in the first suit was a condition precedent to the right to renew the
original action. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the first action and then
attempted to renew the suit under the provisions of §3-808 after the statute
had run. 53 However, at the time of filing the second action, plaintiff had
not paid the costs in the first suit. Section 3-808 allows renewal only where
a valid suit was pending. Also, costs must be paid in order to have a valid
pending suit. 151 Summary judgment for the defendant was affirmed.
Voluntary dismissals under rule 41(a) are allowed subject to the provisions of rule 23(c). The supreme court in State v. Golia5 5 suggested, in
addition, that the Georgia dismissal rule may be limited further due to the
fact that it allows dismissals only of an entire action and not voluntary
dismissals of less than all of several defendants. This interpretation would
be at variance with the federal practice which does permit dismissal of less
than all defendants.
State v. Golia arose out of an action by a distributor of malt beverages
and others seeking to have the Uniform Beer Tax Act declared unconstitutional and seeking injunctive relief. The defendants named were malt beverage wholesalers, the mayor and councilmen of the city where the distributor did business, and the state revenue commissioner. The revenue commissioner filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint and also
filed a motion to dismiss. The other defendants either failed to file an
answer or admitted the allegations in their answer. The plaintiffs then
152.
153.
154.
155.

135 Ga.App. 821, 219 S.E.2d 43 (1975).
GA.CODE ANN. § 3-808 (1975), See Moore v. Tootle, note 89 supra.
GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-141(d) (1975).

235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976).
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moved to voluntarily dismiss the revenue commissioner. No order was
entered by the trial court dismissing the commissioner; however, he was
not named in the injunction.
In considering whether the commissioner had standing to appeal, the
supreme court considered whether he was properly dismissed. The court
noted that while the federal rule does permit dismissal of less than all of
several defendants, the Georgia rule differs and could be interpreted to
permit only the voluntary dismissal of the entire action. In any event, a
dismissal of the revenue commissioner would have required a ruling by the
trial court which was not obtained in this case. Moreover, citing Murphy
v. Hope,5 ' the court stated that a voluntary dismissal without leave of the
court in a class action is ineffectual. Further, the court held the revenue
commissioner to have been an indispensible party to the action because
"[tihe remaining defendants are subject to a substantial risk of incurring
inconsistent obligations because of the commissioner's authority to enforce
this tax statute."' 17 Additionally, the disposition of this case would impair
the commissioner's ability to enforce the statute. In sum, the supreme
court held that the notice filed by the plaintiffs was ineffective to voluntarily dismiss an indispensable party in class action.
The court of appeals construed a dismissal under rule 41(e), for want of
prosecution, not to be an adjudication on the merits and permitted refiling
within six months under §3-808 in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Dobbs5 ' even
though the statute of limitations had run by then. Rule 41(e) provides for
automatic dismissal where no written order is taken in the case for a five
year period.'59 The court of appeals found such a dismissal to be
"involuntary." Arguably, it would be preferable as a matter of policy and
consistent with the purpose of rule 41(e) to treat such involuntary dismissals for failure to prosecute like dismissals for failure to prosecute are
treated under rule 41(b), i.e., as adjudications on the merits which would
prevent further litigation of a claim once dismissed on these grounds.
C. Directed Verdicts - Rule 50
Anderson v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.11 discussed the proper time
to make a motion for a directed verdict. The court of appeals found that
rule 50 described three times when a motion for a directed verdict by a
defendant may be made: (1) at the close of plaintiffs evidence and (2) at
the close of all the evidence or (3) at the close of the case. The court noted
that the language of rule 50(a), "at the close of all the evidence" used in
156.
157.
158.
54, 217
159.
160.

229 Ga. 836, 195 S.E.2d 24 (1972).
235 Ga. at 796, 222 S.E.2d at 32.
134 Ga.App. 225, 213 S.E.2d 915 (1975). Accord, Calloway v. Harms, 135 Ga.App.
S.E.2d 184 (1975).
GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-141(e) (1972).
134 Ga.App. 931, 216 S.E.2d 719 (1975).
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rule 50(b). The Georgia rule thus differs from federal rule 50 which allows
a directed verdict no later than "at the close of all evidence." The federal
rule, however, has been interpreted to mean that a motion for a directed
verdict is timely at any time before the case is submitted to the jury. The
Georgia court reasoned that because the language of the Georgia rule appears to extend the time for directed verdict motions longer than the federal rule, the Georgia rule should be interpreted to allow a motion for
directed verdict to be made any time prior to the return of the verdict by
the jury. Up to this point the plaintiff can still withdraw the case by
voluntary dismissal.' 6 ' The defendants in Anderson made their motion
after both sides had rested and the plaintiff had made his concluding
argument to the jury. Since this was before the judge charged the jury, the
court of appeals held that the motion for directed verdict was timely made
and, subsequently, preserved the defendant's right to move for judgment
n.o.v.
D. Default Judgments - Rule 55
The court of appeals certified to the supreme court the following question in Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, Inc. :' "Does Georgia Code §81A155(b) provide two grounds (providential cause and excusable neglect) or
three grounds (providential cause, excusable neglect and where the judge
from all the facts determines that a proper case has been made) for opening default?"'' 3 The court reviewed previous decisions and followed the
recent decision of Axelroad v. Preston,'" where the supreme court affirmed
the opening of default on the basis of the trial judge's discretion in determining that a proper case had been made even though there was shown
no providential cause or excusable neglect. There are thus three grounds
for opening a default judgment: providential cause, excusable neglect, or
where the judge determines a proper case has been made.
The court of appeals cited three separate provisions of the C.P.A. to
demonstrate that the trial court properly permitted the defendant to open
default in Evans v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.8 5 The three pertinent
provisions are: rule 12, prescribing 30 days for service of the answer "unless
otherwise provided by statute;" rule 6(b), permitting parties by stipulation
to extend the time of filing; and rule 55(a), allowing an automatic default
to be reopened within 15 days by payment of costs and filing the answer.
In this case, defendant's answer was due April 11, 1974; on that date the
parties stipulated that the time would be extended for 30 days. The final
day for filing the answer, May 11, 1974, fell on Saturday and rule 6(a)
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See Deal v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., note 150 supra.
235 Ga. 201, 219 S.E.2d 115 (1975).
Id.at 201, 219 S.E.2d at 115 (1975).
232 Ga. 836, 209 S.E.2d 178 (1974).
135 Ga.App. 75, 217 S.E.2d 318 (1975).
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therefore extended the answer period until Monday, May 13, 1974. Thus,
Goodyear's filing on May 28, 1974, was within the 15 day period provided
by rule 55, and the trial judge properly allowed the defendant to open the
default by paying the costs and filing his defenses.
E.

Summary Judgments -

Rule 56

Rule 56(c) requires that a motion for summary judgment be served on
an opposing party at least 30 days prior to the hearing. In Peoples Financial Corp. of Rome v. Jones,'6 the plaintiff originally moved for summary
judgment, but no hearing was ever held. Several months later the defendant moved for summary judgment, such motion being granted less than
30 days after being filed.6 7 The court of appeals, relying on federal cases
holding that it was error to grant summary judgment without allowing the
time specified or without giving the opposing party an opportunity to be
heard, reversed. There was no showing that plaintiff was informed when
judgment would be rendered or that plaintiff had waived his right to be
heard.
In contrast, the case of Cel-Ko Builders & Developers, Inc. v. BX Corp.'6 8
presented a situation where the opposing party was properly notified of the
hearing on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. However, on the day
of the hearing, plaintiff sought summary judgment on two additional
counts in the complaint. Again relying on federal cases, the court of appeals found that the defendant was not prejudiced by the additional
grounds, since the plaintiff's affidavits, which were filed 30 days before the
hearing, gave the defendant adequate notice that plaintiff sought summary judgment on all counts in the complaint. Thus, in general, motion
for summary judgment must be filed 30 days before hearing and the opposing party must have an opportunity to be heard, unless no prejudice will
occur to the opposing party if a hearing in a lesser time is allowed.
The function of a summary judgment proceeding is to ascertain if there
is a genuine factual dispute. However, if a dispute as to the facts appears,
the court cannot attempt in this proceeding to resolve the facts or reconcile
166. 134 Ga.App. 649, 215 S.E.2d 711 (1975).
167. While GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-156(c) requires service of the motion at least 30 days
before the hearing, once notice is served, a hearing at any time after the expiration of 30 days
satisfies the requirement. In McKinnon v. Trivett, 136 Ga.App. 59, 220 S.E.2d 63 (1975), the
defendant filed several motions for summary judgment and hearing dates were set, but the
hearings were never held. The third time a hearing was scheduled, plaintiff failed to appear
and the trial judge ordered his appearance at a hearing four days from the date of the order.
When plaintiff again failed to appear, summary judgment was granted. The court of appeals
found no error, relying on GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-178. After the initial 30 day period has passed,
the court, under authority of C.P.A. rule 78, could make any orders for hearing of actions on
reasonable notice.
168. 136 Ga.App. 777, 222 S.E.2d 94 (1975).
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the issues. In Fletcher Emerson Management Co. v. Davis,'" plaintiffappellee contended that the circumstantial evidence presented by
defendant-appellant was not sufficient to defeat its motion for summary
judgment. The court of appeals observed that the opposing party is entitled to all reasonable doubts and favorable inferences and
where there is some evidence-albeit circumstantial, from which a jury
may infer actual knowledge of the existence of an agency, and this circumstantial evidence is in conflict with direct evidence of the movant, this
conflict is sufficient to raise an issue required to be submitted to the triers
of fact
and the court erred in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff. 70
Georgia Motor Club, Inc. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of
Augusta 7 ' dealt with the appealability of a denial of a motion for summary
judgment. Prior to July 1, 1975, the denial of motion for summary judgment could not be appealled without a certificate from the trial judge even
though the appeal was accompanied by a final, reviewable judgment. Rule
56(h) of the C.P.A. precluded such review with the language "order denying summary judgment is not subject to review by direct appeal or
otherwise.' 7 However, in 1975 this section was amended and the language
"or otherwise" was deleted.' The court of appeals interpreted this deletion to signal a legislative intent to limit the certificate requirement to
instances where a direct appeal from the denial is sought. The effect of the
1975 amendment was "to modify the law to now permit review of the denial
of a summary judgment without the necessity of making application for
interlocutory appeal where there is a final judgment which is the basis of
the appeal. On direct appeal such application is, of course, mandatory."'7 4
In this case there was a final judgment serving as the ground for the direct
appeal, namely, the grant of a summary judgment to the other party, and
the court of appeals could properly consider the denial of appellant's motion for summary judgment along with the grant of the opposite party's
motion without a certificate of review under amended rule 56(h).'75
169. 134 Ga.App. 699, 215 S.E.2d 725 (1975).
170. Id. at 702, 215 S.E.2d at 728.
171. 137 Ga.App. 521, 224 S.E.2d 498 (1976).
172. GA.CoDE ANN. § 81A-156(h) (1972) (emphasis added).
173. GA.CoDE ANN. § 81A-156(h) (Supp. 1975).
174. 137 Ga.App. at 525, 224 S.E.2d at 501.
175. An additional case of interest, Dukes v. Joyner, 234 Ga. 526, 216 S.E.2d 822 (1975),
upheld a judgment on the pleadings in an appeal from the probate court to the superior court.
The supreme court reasoned that a motion for judgment on the pleadings was closely related
to a motion for summary judgment, which is authorized in probate proceedings in superior
court on appeal from the probate court. A judgment on the pleadings may be granted in such
appeal where the record shows an essential element of the appellant's case is lacking and is
incapable of proof.
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Motion for New Trial-§70-301

During this survey period, the court of appeals decided two cases involving extraordinary motions for new trials based on Georgia Code §70301. In Vaughn v. Car Tapes, Inc.,' 7 the trial court reinstated a suit
which had been dismissed for lack of prosecution. Plaintiff's counsel did
not receive notice that the case was scheduled for trial through an error
in mailing and consequently failed to appear when the case was called.
Upon learning of the dismissal some seven months later, plaintiff filed a
motion for reinstatement. The trial court correctly dealt with this as an
extraordinary motion for new trial under §70-301 and C.P.A. rules 60(c)
and (f).7 7 Section 70-308 gives the trial court legal discretion to grant a new
trial on grounds not specifically provided for by law. The court of appeals
found no abuse of discretion here; that plaintiff's counsel did not receive
notice of trial due to the court clerk's mailing error was sufficient excuse
for the delay in filing the motion for new trial and a sufficient ground upon
which to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial. Reinstatement was
accomplished by an extraordinary motion for new trial which could be
considered after the term at which the dismissal judgment was entered.
In Barfield v. McEntyre,178 plaintiff was granted a new trial on the basis
of a motion filed more than 30 days after the entry of judgment. The court
of appeals reversed because this was not properly an extraordinary motion.
The motion contained grounds which could have been made in a regular
motion within the 30-day period. The motion here was extraordinary only
because it came after the expiration of the allotted time.
G.

Relief from Judgments-Rule 60

A motion to set aside a judgment under rule 60(d) cannot cure an earlier
failure to answer when the defendant has been properly served unless the
plaintiff's complaint shows conclusively on its face that the plaintiff's
claim was invalid. 7 By failing to answer, a defendant looses the right to
object that the plaintiff's complaint has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and can prevail only if the pleadings show that no
80
claim in fact existed.
Two recent cases deal with problems of collaterally attacking judgments
for lack of jurisdiction over the party. In Green Acres Discount, Inc. v.
Freid & Appell, Inc., s' the court of appeals employed the well-settled
principle that when a party contests an issue of personal jurisdiction in the
court of another state and loses, he may not later collaterally attack that
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

135 Ga.App. 178, 217 S.E.2d 436 (1975).
GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-160(c)&(f) (1972).
136 Ga.App. 294, 221 S.E.2d 58 (1975).
Robinson-Shamburger, Inc. v. Tenney, 135 Ga.App. 131, 217 S.E.2d 184 (1975).
GA.CODE ANN. § 81A-160(d) (1972).
135 Ga.App. 816, 219 S.E.2d 39 (1975).
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judgment when it is sought to be enforced in Georgia. Here, the defendant
was served in accordance with New York's long-arm statute and made a
"special appearance" in New York to contest jurisdiction. Although a special appearance does not waive the defendant's defense of lack of jurisdiction, where the issue has been raised, fully and fairly litigated, and decided
adversely to the defendant in the foreign court, its judgment is conclusive
and precludes relitigation of that issue. Green Acres is a correct application
of basic jurisdictional rules.' 2
The decision in Thrift v. Vi-Vin Products, Inc.,'" on the other hand,
seems plainly wrong. Plaintiff sued the defendant on open account in the
state court of DeKalb County. Plaintiff asserted personal jurisdiction over
the non-resident defendant under Georgia's long-arm statute. The defendant was served with process in New Jersey but did not appear or defend.
Following the entry of a default judgment, the defendant moved in the
rendering court to set aside the judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.
According to the court of appeals, the defendant had waived this defense
by its failure to assert the lack of jurisdiction before default by answer or
motion, citing C.P.A. rule 12(h) as authority:
The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived if no motion
to dismiss on this ground has been made nor included in a responsive
pleading. C.P.A. §12(h)(1). . . . It appears that defendant was properly
served with process in accordance with the Long Arm Statute. It was then
incumbent on it to raise the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by
motion or by answer. Defendant did neither. Therefore, a waiver of this
defense resulted. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over defendant's
person and the resulting judgment by default was conclusive. Aiken v.
Bynum, 128 Ga. App. 212, 196 S.E.2d 180.' s"
Vi- Vin Products cannot be correct. A state cannot acquire personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant whenever the defendant fails to appear by merely giving notice. The non-resident always has the option of
staying out of the forum state and collaterally attacking the judgment
when it is sought to be enforced against him elsewhere." 5 Similarly, the
non-resident defendant should be able to stay out, suffer a default judgment, and then move to set aside the default for a lack of personal jurisdiction in the rendering court itself.
The decision in Aiken v. Bynum' on which the court of appeals relied
is not apposite. There, the defendant who had been served but had not
182. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Durfee v.
Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Drake v. Drake, 187 Ga. 423(5), 1 S.E.2d 573 (1939).
183. 134 Ga.App. 717, 215 S.E.2d 709 (1975).
184. 134 Ga.App. at 718, 215 S.E.2d at 710.
185. See generally Developments in the Law- State Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L. REV.

909, 991 (1960).
186.

128 Ga.App. 212, 196 S.E.2d 180 (1973).
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appeared moved to set aside a default judgment because of improper
venue. The court in Aiken did state in dicta that the failure of the defendant to appear did waive his objection to lack of venue where the defendant
had actual notice of the suit. However, it is far from certain that the dicta
in Aiken that objections to venue can be waived can be carried over and
applied to objections to personal jurisdiction by a non-resident.
The result in Vi-Vin Products appears to have been overturned by the
1974 amendment to rule 60(d) which now expressly allows a motion to set
aside to be based on a lack of jurisdiction over the person. 7 As the court
of appeals explained in Phillips v. Williams,' "[tihe effect of this amendment is to prevent waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction under C.P.A.
§12(h)(1) by allowing it to be raised in a motion to set aside under C.P.A.
§60(d)." 8 9
187. GA.CoDE ANN. § 81A-160(d) (1972) provides in part that "a motion to set aside shall
also lie to attack a judgment based upon lack of jurisdiction over the person or subject matter,
regardless of whether such lack of jurisdiction appears upon the face of the record of pleadings."
188. 137 Ga.App. 578, 224 S.E.2d 515 (1976).
189. 137 Ga.App. at 580, 224 S.E.2d at 517. In Adams v. Adams, 234 Ga. 139, 214 S.E.2d
561 (1975), the supreme court dealt with the difference between a motion to set aside under
rule 60 (d) and a complaint in equity under rule 60(e). Here a husband sought to set aside a
judgment for divorce and alimony awarded his wife in an action in which he was served but
did not appear on the ground that he could not have been validly married to that wife because
he was legally still married to another. This defense could not be raised by rule 60(d) motion
to set aside because it was not based on a non-amendable defect appearing upon the face of
the record or pleadings. Although'in theory such a claim could be cognizable as a complaint
in equity since the complaint sought an annulment, the plaintiff could not now complain
about his legal incapacity to marry because he had passed up his opportunity to assert this
defense at trial.

